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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
SMIGIEL v. FRANCHOT: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS 
THE POWER TO ENACT LEGISLATION THAT IS 
CONTINGENT UPON PASSAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT THROUGH POPULAR VOTE THAT WOULD 
ALLOW SLOT MACHINES IN MARYLAND. 
By: Matthew Powell 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the General Assembly validly enacted legislation that was contingent upon voter 
approval of a proposed constitutional amendment to allow slot 
machines in Maryland. Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 978 A.2d 
687 (2009). Furthermore, the court held that a judicial challenge to 
one house's adjournment for more than three days, without the consent 
of the other house, was a nonjusticiable political question. fd. at 325-
26, 978 A.2d at 701. 
On October 29, 2007, Governor Martin O'Malley proposed 
legislation designed to generate funds to increase budget savings and 
combat a potential $1.7 billion deficit by implementing slot machines 
in Maryland. The General Assembly conducted a special session for 
the sole purpose of passing or rejecting the Governor's proposed 
legislation. On November 12, 2007, which was a Monday and 
Veterans' Day, it was evident that the House of Delegates would not 
have a bill prepared for the Senate's consideration for several days. In 
light of this, on the same day, the President of the Senate contacted the 
Speaker ofthe House of Delegates and requested the House's approval 
of the Senate's extended adjournment. The Speaker consented, and 
the Speaker's staff issued and responded to a memorandum of consent. 
However, neither message was read to the House of Delegates, nor did 
the House of Delegates vote on whether to approve the Senate's 
extended adjournment. Still, the Senate extended its adjournment, 
which had already consisted of the three-day Veterans' Day weekend, 
until Thursday, while it awaited receipt of the House's version of the 
bill. 
On November 15, 2007, the Senate reconvened and remained in 
session along with the House until November 19, 2007, when the 
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houses reconciled differences between their versions of the bills and 
passed legislation entitled "Maryland Education Trust Fund-Video 
Lottery Terminals," which Governor O'Malley signed into law on the 
same day. The enactment of the bill was contingent upon the passage 
of a constitutional amendment through a majority vote in a general 
election. 
However, prior to the Senate reconvening on November 15, 2007, 
Michael Smigiel ("Smigiel"), a member of the House of Delegates, 
inquired as to whether the Senate's adjournment extension violated 
Article III, section 25 of the Maryland Constitution, which requires 
approval from the other chamber for adjournments of more than three 
days. The House Parliamentarian rejected Smigiel's challenge and 
concluded that the General Assembly was "constitutionally proceeding 
appropriately. " 
On December 13,2007, Smigiel filed a Verified Complaint seeking 
Emergency Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court for 
Carroll County challenging the legislation. On January 10, 2008, the 
circuit court granted the State's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the 
legislation was valid. Smigiel appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland while simultaneously petitioning the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted the writ before the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland could hear oral arguments. 
The court considered two issues. Smigiel, 410 Md. at 310, 978 
A.2d at 692. First, the court addressed whether the General Assembly 
may pass a bill that is contingent upon voter approval of a proposed 
constitutional amendment. Id. Second, the court considered whether 
bills passed during an extraordinary session, in which the Senate 
extended its adjournment without obtaining approval of the House of 
Delegates, are valid. Id. 
As to the contingency issue, Smigiel contended that the legislation 
was an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power. Id. Smigiel 
relied on Brawner v. Supervisors of Elections, wherein the court struck 
down legislation that hinged its effectiveness and validity upon voter 
approval. Id. at 311-12,978 A.2d at 693-94 (citing Brawner, 141 Md. 
586,602, 119 A. 250, 254 (1922)). 
The court distinguished the instant case from Brawner. Id. at 312-
13, 978 A.2d at 694. In Brawner, the court rejected the General 
Assembly'S effort to place an already enacted and signed statute 
before the voters for approval or disapproval. Smigiel, 410 Md. at 
312-13, 978 A.2d at 694. In the present situation, however, the 
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legislature asked voters to approve a proposed constitutional 
amendment in accordance with Article XIV, section 1 of the Maryland 
Constitution. ld. at 313, 978 A.2d at 694. Voter approval of the 
constitutional amendment would then trigger appropriations in the 
already enacted bills. Id. As a result, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland declared that, unlike the voters in Brawner, voters in this 
case were not approving or rejecting a statute, but rather, were 
approving or rejecting a constitutional amendment upon which a 
statute was merely contingent. Id. The court held that, not only does 
the General Assembly have the power to enact legislation contingent 
upon popular approval of a constitutional amendment by the state's 
voters, but that this practice has occurred on multiple occasions in 
Maryland. Id. at 316-17, 978 A.2d at 696-97 (citing 1990 Md. Laws, 
Chapters 62 & 515 (clerks of court-employees and funding), 1980 
Md. Laws, Chapters 523, 525, & 526 (supreme bench consolidation), 
and 1972 Md. Laws, Chapters 364 & 365 (state lottery)). This 
practice has also been approved by other state courts and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Id. at 317-18, 978 A.2d at 696-97 (citing 
Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36 (1925); Fullam v. Brock, 271 N.C. 
145, 155 S.E.2d 737 (1967); Henson v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 220 
Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965)). 
Regarding the adjournment issue, Article III, section 25 of the 
Maryland Constitution states that neither house in the General 
Assembly shall adjourn for more than three days without the consent 
of the other house. Smigiel, 410 Md. at 321, 978 A.2d at 699 (citing 
MD. CONST. art. III, § 25). Smigiel argued that the President of the 
Senate violated article III, section 25 by extending the Senate's 
adjournment beyond three days without obtaining approval from the 
House of Delegates. Id. Specifically, Smigiel asserted that the 
Maryland Constitution required the Senate to obtain the consent of the 
House of Delegates sitting as a legislative body. Id. As a result of the 
Senate's failure to comply with the constitutional requirements, 
Smigiel argued that the court's only recourse would be to invalidate all 
legislation passed during the extraordinary session. Id. at 321-22, 978 
A.2d 699. 
While the court recognized that article III, section 25 ensures that 
both houses of the General Assembly fulfill their legislative duties, the 
court disagreed with Smigiel's assertion that the Senate's failure to 
comply should invalidate all legislation passed during the legislative 
session. Id. at 322, 978 A.2d at 699. As a threshold issue, the court 
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considered whether judicial review of the Senate's adjournment could 
occur. Id. at 323, 978 A.2d 700. 
In Lamb v. Hammond, a case involving a court-ordered count of 
absentee ballots in a House of Delegates election, the ~ourt adopted a 
two-part test to detennine whether an issue is a nonjusticiable political 
question that is not subject to judicial review. Smigiel, 410 Md. at 
323-24, 978 A.2d 700-01 (citing Lamb, 308 Md. 286, 293, 518 A.2d 
1057, 1060 (1987)). First, a court must evaluate whether the claim 
presented and the relief sought are capable of judicial resolution. Id. at 
324, 978 A.2d 701 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-
17 (1969)). Second, a court has to detennine whether the 
governmental structure renders the presented issue a political question 
barred from judicial consideration under the Constitution. Id. at 325, 
978 A.2d at 701 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 517). 
The court concluded that the proposed issue contravened the 
second prong of the Lamb test as a nonjusticiable political question 
because addressing the issue would fail to respect a coordinate branch 
of government, the legislature. Id. at 325-26, 978 A.2d at 701. 
Therefore, the court declared that the issue of consensual adjournment 
is best resolved by the General Assembly. Id. at 325-26, 978 A.2d at 
701. 
In Smigiel v. Franchot, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
guaranteed the General Assembly's ability to pass legislation that is 
contingent upon popular approval of a constitutional amendment, 
which allows the General Assembly to pass bills that anticipate or 
adapt legislation to pending constitutional amendments. In doing so, 
the court struck down what many recognized as an ad hoc and 
frivolous challenge to validly passed legislation. Additionally, the 
decision requires the General Assembly to enforce its own policies and 
procedures internally. While the court's decision primarily impacts 
legislators, practitioners and judges should also note the reaffinnation 
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 
